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THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
PRECEDENTIAL OPINION SUMMARY
The Precedential Opinion Summary collects precedential opinions issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit between January 1,
2019 and December 1, 2019. This compilation is designed to serve as a
research tool rather than provide comprehensive analysis on any particular opinion. The summary is organized into two parts: civil and criminal
matters, and within each part by issues of first impression, cases considered en banc, and an appendix of precedential opinions arranged by subject matter.
CIVIL MATTERS
Issues of First Impression
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW—GUN CONTROL ACT OF 1968—In Simpson v. Attorney General of United States,1 the Third Circuit considered what standard
to apply in determining whether a violation of the Gun Control Act (GCA)
was willful.2 Judge Vanaskie, joined by Judge Chagares and Judge Jordan,
held “that a violation of the GCA is willful where the licensee: (1) knew of
his legal obligations under the GCA, and (2) either purposefully disregarded or was plainly indifferent to GCA requirements.”3 Adopting this
standard, the Third Circuit followed the unanimous view of all the Courts
of Appeals that had addressed the issue.4 Applying the standard to the
facts of the case, the court affirmed the district court’s ruling “[b]ecause it
[was] clear that Simpson knew or was plainly indifferent to his obligations
by committing hundreds of GCA violations.”5 Even further, the court
noted the licensee’s prior conformity with GCA standards, indicating
“knowledge of [the licensee’s] obligations.”6
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW—IMMIGRATION LAW—In Mejia-Castanon v. Attorney General of United States,7 the court considered whether to give deference
to the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision to not apply the
stop-time rule to the good moral character requirement.8 In order to be
considered for cancellation of removal as an undocumented alien, the individual must “have maintained a continuous physical presence in the
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

913 F.3d 110 (3d Cir. 2019) (Vanaskie, J.).
Id. at 112.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 112.
Id.
Id. at 116.
931 F.3d 224 (3d Cir. 2019) (Scirica, J.).
Id. at 226.

(847)
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United States for at least ten years and have been a person of good moral
character for such a period.”9 Nevertheless, under Congress’s implementation of the “stop-time rule,” the calculation of the ten years of physical
presence requirement occurs at the time the Department of Homeland
Security serves an individual with a notice to appear.10 The issue at hand
analyzed an undocumented immigrant’s removal and subsequent appeal
for cancellation of removal.11 The BIA deemed the petitioner ineligible
for removal based on not passing the character requirements, specifically,
the petitioner’s participation in “alien smuggling.”12 But, as the petitioner
argued, the conduct in question occurred after they were served with a
notice to appear, thus, the stop-time rule would apply.13 Judge Scirica
considered the petitioner’s position and determined that the provision
was ambiguous, as it was possible the petitioner’s interpretation was correct or that the provision applied only to the physical presence requirement.14 The court eventually granted the BIA’s interpretation of the rule
Chevron deference and held the stop-time rule does not apply to the good
moral character requirement.15 Judge Siler, sitting in designation, dissented, finding that the provision is not ambiguous and that the plain language requires the stop-rule to apply to the character requirement.16
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW—IMMIGRATION—In Nkomo v. Attorney General of
United States,17 the court first decided “whether a notice to appear that fails
to specify the time and place of an initial removal hearing deprives an
immigration judge of jurisdiction over the removal proceedings.”18 Judge
Hardiman, writing for the court, stated three reasons for deciding to join
the other circuit courts in rejecting Nkomo’s argument: (1) Congress did
not place a jurisdictional limitation in the particular section at issue that
exists in other sections of the removal proceedings statutes; (2) Supreme
Court precedent relied on by Nkomo is a narrow holding that does not
apply in this context; and (3) the regulation at issue was classified as a
“charging document,” suggesting that the filing requirement services a different purpose than the notice to appear.19 Thus, the court held that the
failure to specify time and place of an initial removal hearing did not deprive the immigration judge of jurisdiction.20 The court then affirmed
with the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) denial of petitioner’s with9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id at 230.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 230, 232.
15. See id. at 226–27, 235–36.
16. Id. at 237 (Siler, J., dissenting).
17. 930 F.3d 129 (3d Cir. 2019) (Hardiman, J.)
18. Id. at 131.
19. Id. at 133–34.
20. Id. at 134.
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holding for removal, stating that the BIA did not err in concluding the
alien’s conviction for wire fraud constituted a conviction for a “particularly
serious crime.”21 Finally, the court declined to review the petitioner’s
Convention Against Torture claim because it believed it lacked the jurisdiction to do so.22
ANTITRUST—FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT—In FTC v. Shire
ViroPharma, Inc.,23 the Third Circuit refused the FTC’s request to broadly
construe the meaning of Section 13(b) of the FTC Act.24 The FTC argued
that showing a past violation of the statute and a reasonable likelihood of
future violation should satisfy the phrase “is violating, or is about to violate.”25 Chief Judge Smith, writing for the court, affirmed the district
court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim because the FTC could not
overcome the unambiguous language of Section 13(b) to try to include
past violations that may recur.26 The Third Circuit distinguished this issue
from similar interpretations of securities laws because the statutes pertain
to different subject matter and “the ordinary meaning of [the] statute . . .
provide[d] sufficient guidance to [its] meaning.”27 The court believed
broadly construing the language would cut against the language’s explicitness, and no cases were cited to support such an interpretation.28
ANTITRUST—ATTORNEYS’ FEES CLAIM—In FTC v. Penn State Hershey
Medical Center,29 the court considered whether the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania could recover attorneys’ fees following its successful motion
to enjoin a merger under Section 16 of the Clayton Act and Section 13(b)
of the FTC Act.30 The district court denied an award of attorney’s fees to
the commonwealth, ruling that the commonwealth had not “substantially
prevailed” for purposes of Section 16 of the Clayton Act.31 The Third
Circuit affirmed the denial, but on different grounds, holding instead that
the injunction the commonwealth prevailed on was actually ordered
under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act.32 Thus, the attorney fee provisions
of the Clayton Act were irrelevant to the inquiry before the court.33 Nev21. Id. at 134–35.
22. Id. at 135–36.
23. 917 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2019) (Smith, C.J.).
24. Id. at 161.
25. Id. at 150.
26. Id. at 161.
27. Id. at 158 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Liberty LincolnMercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 171 F.3d 818, 823 (3d Cir. 1999)) (focusing on
plain language of Section 13(b)). The court believed the FTC could still address
the “parade of horribles” it suggested would occur without a broad interpretation
through administrative proceedings. Id. at 159.
28. Id. at 158–59.
29. 914 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2019) (Nygaard, J.).
30. Id. at 194–95.
31. Id. at 195.
32. Id. at 196, 199–200.
33. Id. at 196.
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ertheless, Judge Nygaard, writing for the court, ordered the injunction
under the FTC Act, which does not contain attorney fee provisions, and
prevented the commonwealth from recovering the fees.34
BANKRUPTCY—TITLE XI—In In re Heckler & Stelzle-Hackler,35 the Third
Circuit discussed whether a real estate title transfer, conducted in accordance with New Jersey’s tax foreclosure procedures, may be voided as
“preferential” under Section 547(b) of the United States Bankruptcy
Code.36 Judge Roth, joined by Judge McKee and Judge Porter, held that
the real estate title transfer was properly voided under Section 547(b) requirements.37 In making this determination, the court relied on the plain
language of the statute and confirmed that it did conflict with any New
Jersey state law.38 The court also noted that the Tax Injunction Act was
not violated when the transfer at issue occurred.39 Finally, the court declined to reverse the decision purely based on policy concerns raised by
the appellant.40 In sum, because the transfer at issue met all of the plain
language requirements of Section 547(b), it was voided properly.41
CIVIL PROCEDURE—CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT—In Coba v. Ford Motor
Co.,42 Judge Krause, writing for Judges Jordan and Roth, decided a procedural issue of first impression.43 The court had to determine whether,
under the Class Action Fairness Act, a federal court that had jurisdiction at
the time a claim was filed or removed loses subject-matter jurisdiction
when it denies class certification.44 In joining the Second, Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, the court determined denial of class certification did not make jurisdiction improper.45 On the merits of their claim,
petitioner challenged “the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on
his claims for breach of express warranty, breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, and violation of [New Jersey Consumer
Fraud Act].”46 On the breach of warranty claim, the court affirmed the
district court’s finding that the warranty covered only “materials or workmanship” and not “design-defects,” and that the fuel tank problem in this
case was a design defect.47 “Because Coba did not have any right to repair
or replacement of his fuel tanks . . . he also could not prevail on his claim
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 197.
938 F.3d 473 (3d Cir. 2019) (Roth, J.).
Id. at 475.
Id.
Id. at 584.
Id. at 480–81.
Id. at 481–82.
Id.
932 F.3d 114 (3d Cir. 2019) (Krause, J.).
Id. at 118–19.
Id. at 119.
Id. at 119 n.2.
Id. at 120.
Id.
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for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”48 On
the petitioner’s NJCFA claim, the Third Circuit determined that the evidence did not support a finding that Ford “knew and did not disclose that
the fuel tank suffered from a design defect” or “that even if Ford did not
know the cause . . . it failed to disclose the risk.”49
CIVIL PROCEDURE—FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 65(C)—In National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Governor of New Jersey,50 the Third Circuit addressed when an enjoined party may recover on a bond and to what
extent the district court has discretion to deny damages.51 Judge Rendell,
joined by Judge McKee, held that the term “wrongfully enjoined” should
be explicitly interpreted to mean that a “party had a right all along to do
what it was enjoined from doing.”52 The New Jersey Thoroughbred
Horsemen’s Association (NJTHA) was enjoined from sports gambling due
to the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PAPSA), which
the Supreme Court later held to be unconstitutional.53 Therefore, the
NJTHA “had a right to conduct sports gambling all along,” and was wrongfully enjoined.54 The Third Circuit vacated the district court’s denial of
NJTHA’s recovery on the posted bond and damages, and remanded for
the district court to determine how much is to be collected.55 In dissent,
Judge Porter argued a party is not wrongfully enjoined if the temporary
restraining order adversely affecting the party is based on different
grounds than a federal act proven unconstitutional, such as in this case.56
CIVIL PROCEDURE—TOLLING STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS—In Blake v. JP
Morgan Chase Bank NA,57 the Third Circuit answered whether it may apply
American Pipe tolling to class actions that are filed while another timely
filed class action, that raises the same issue against defendant, is ongoing.58 The court explained that American Pipe tolling59 is limited to individual claims and not class actions.60 Because the petitioners sued while
48. Id. at 124.
49. Id.
50. 939 F.3d 597 (3d Cir. 2019) (Rendell, J.).
51. Id. at 603.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 603–04.
54. Id. at 606.
55. Id. at 609.
56. Id. at 609 (Porter, J., dissenting).
57. 927 F.3d 701 (3d Cir. 2019) (Bibas, J.)
58. Id. at 703.
59. The Third Circuit defined American Pipe tolling as when a class action delays “the claims of . . . putative class members.” Id. at 708. By tolling the claims,
plaintiffs need not question whether they can successfully file a claim before the
statute of limitations period ends. Id. Instead, the claim is preserved through the
putative class action. Id. at 708–09.
60. Id. at 709. In making this assertion, the Third Circuit relied on recent
Supreme Court precedent discussing tolling class actions and stated “[c]ourts may
not toll new class actions just because there was a prior timely class action.” Id.
(citing China Agritech, Inc. v. Resh, 138 S. Ct. 1800, 1811 (2018)).
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another timely filed class action was ongoing, they believed it differentiated their claim’s timing from a class action filed after a court fully adjudicates a previous class action.61 This, in effect, would help petitioners avoid
and distinguish from Supreme Court precedent disallowing class actions
after a previous one had been adjudicated.62 The court held that this distinguishing fact did not upset the tolling limitations on class actions, and it
did not interpret Supreme Court precedent to allow “overlapping class
actions.”63 Therefore, the Third Circuit found the petitioners filed an untimely class action and affirmed the district court’s decision dismissing the
claim.64
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—ARTICLE III STANDING—In Prometheus Radio
Project v. FCC,65 the Third Circuit answered the question of when in the
litigation process parties may submit materials to establish standing.66
Judge Ambro, joined by Judge Fuentes, held that parties may establish
standing by submitting materials “at any time in the litigation.”67 The parties had participated in litigation for so long that, according to the court, it
“was readily apparent” petitioners had proper standing.68 The court held
that the petitioners properly submitted declarations and reply briefs, thus,
establishing standing. The Third Circuit joined the position explicitly
held by the Ninth Circuit and implicitly followed by the Tenth and Seventh Circuits.69 On the merits of the issue, the court held that the FCC’s
Reconsideration and Incubator Orders did not sufficiently consider how
its ownership rule changes would affect women and minorities.70 Judge
Scirica, concurring in part and dissenting in part, argued the FCC should
implement their orders and independently evaluate the new rules’ effects.71 Judge Scircia posited that the orders may not necessarily harm
diversity ownership, and the court should leave the FCC to “enjoy a measure of deference when it balances [its] policy objectives.”72 Judge Scirica
also noted the FCC’s previous acknowledgement that the new ownership
rules proved not to adversely affect minority or women ownership.73
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 710.
64. Id. at 710.
65. 939 F.3d 567 (3d Cir. 2019) (Ambro, J.).
66. Id. at 578.
67. Id. at 579.
68. Id.
69. Id. These circuits have all stated that parties can acquire proper Article III
standing at varying points during litigation. See id. Specifically, when challenging
agency actions, parties can “supplement the administrative record,” and in turn,
establish standing. Id.
70. Id. at 577–78.
71. Id. at 589–90 (Scirica, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
72. Id. at 593 (Scirica, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
73. Id. at 594 (Scririca, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol65/iss4/3

6

Editors: Third Circuit Review Precedential Opinion Summary

2020]

THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW

853

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—ARTICLE III STANDING—In Kamal v. J. Crew
Group, Inc.,74 the Third Circuit addressed whether procedural violations of
the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (FACTA) alleging a
“material risk of harm” could establish standing.75 Judge Scirica, joined by
Judge Chagares and Judge Rendell, held that technical violations of
FACTA constitute concrete injury when the violation “actually harms or
presents a material risk of harm to the underlying concrete interest.”76
The court found this matter different than previous standing reviews because the material risk of harm had not yet materialized for the plaintiff.77
In order to materially risk harm to an underlying interest, there must be a
close relationship to a harm traditionally regarded as providing a common
law cause of action.78 The court used examples of other “[h]arms actionable under traditional privacy torts” to conclude the situation at hand did
not qualify as one of material risk.79 The court relied on this historical
comparison in determining the plaintiff’s alleged harm had no tort law
analog, thus, denying the claim.80 In making this decision, the Third Circuit joined the Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits’ interpretation of material risk of harm to establish Article III standing.81
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—FIRST AMENDMENT—In Adams v. Governor of
Delaware,82 the Third Circuit decided whether Article IV, Section 3 of the
Delaware Constitution, which requires judicial positions to be appointed
based on political party affiliation, violated the U.S. Constitution’s First
Amendment Freedom of Association protection.83 After granting a petition for rehearing,84 the court held that judges do not fall within the
policymakers exception, which permits political-based criteria for appointment decisions.85 Because a judge’s decision-making is independent and
not tied to the allegiance of an appointing government officer, they do
not fall within the exception.86 The court applied a strict scrutiny analysis
and held that Delaware failed to show this is the most narrowly tailored
74. 918 F.3d 102 (3d Cir. 2019) (Scirica, J.).
75. Id. at 113.
76. Id. at 112.
77. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
78. Id. at 114.
79. Id. at 114–15.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 112–13.
82. 922 F.3d 166 (3d Cir. 2019) (Fuentes, J.).
83. Id. at 169.
84. See Adams v. Governor of Del., 920 F.3d 878, 878 (3d Cir. 2019) (vacating
and granting rehearing). In the original Third Circuit opinion, Judge Fuentes
held that the petitioner challenging the Delaware constitution had Article III
standing, but declined to evaluate whether Delaware’s interest in political balance
rendered the statute constitutional. See Adams v. Governor of Del., 914 F.3d 827,
835, 843 (3d Cir. 2019), vacated, 920 F.3d 878, affirming in part, reversing in part, 922
F.3d 166 (3d Cir. 2019).
85. Adams, 922 F.3d at 178.
86. Id. at 178–81.
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way to fulfill its state interest of having a politically balanced judiciary.87
Therefore, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment decision for the petitioner and held that article IV, section 3 of the
Delaware Constitution was unconstitutional.88 Judge McKee, joined by
Judge Fuentes and Judge Restrepo, concurred in the judgment.89 Judge
McKee noted that despite Delaware’s non-partisan reputation within the
judicial system, reputation alone is not a sufficient justification for the
strict restrictions the selection process has on an individual’s right to freely
associate.90
IMMIGRATION LAW—EQUAL PROTECTION—In Tineo v. Attorney General
of United States,91 the Third Circuit considered whether 8 U.S.C.
§ 1432(a)(2), which treats men and women differently for purposes of
transmitting citizenship to their out-of-wedlock children, requires courts
to apply its rationale without limits.92 “[U]nder the now repealed 8 U.S.C.
§ 1432(a)(2),” a naturalized mother could transmit citizenship to her outof-wedlock child regardless of whether the father was alive, but a naturalized father in the same position would need to legitimize his child to transmit his citizenship.93 In Tineo, the petitioner was born outside of the U.S.
to unwed, non-U.S. citizen parents; his father moved to the U.S. and became a naturalized citizen, while his mother soon passed away.94 At the
time, the only way for the petitioner to become a legitimate child of his
father was if his birth parents married.95 Recognizing this rule would always preclude the petitioner from deriving citizenship from his father, the
Third Circuit held Section 1432(a)(2), as presently applied, did not satisfy
the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.96 Applying intermediate
scrutiny, the court determined the government failed to establish an important government interest in denying defendant citizenship through his
father, thus, granting the defendant’s petition to review his order of removal.97 Chief Judge Smith dissented in part, positing that a “substantial
relationship” existed between the law and Congress’s objective of establishing “a true filial tie.”98
IMMIGRATION LAW—FIFTH AMENDMENT—In Carbrera v. Attorney General
of United States,99 the Third Circuit considered the constitutionality of “dis87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 181–83.
Id. at 184–85.
Id. at 185 (McKee, J., concurring).
Id. at 186–87. (McKee, J., concurring).
937 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2019) (Greenaway Jr., J.).
Id. at 204–05.
Id. at 204.
Id. at 205.
Id. at 204.
Id. at 209–10.
Id. at 219.
Id. at 221 (Smith, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
921 F.3d 401 (3d Cir. 2019) (Rendell, J.).
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parate treatment on the basis of adoptive status in the citizenship context.”100 Judge Rendell, writing for the court, agreed with the Second and
Ninth Circuits that rational basis review is the appropriate standard of review for distinctions on the basis of adoptive status, thus, disparate treatment was constitutional.101 The court concluded that promoting a
relationship between the child and citizen parent, preventing fraud, and
protecting the rights of alien parents served as valid justifications for treatment.102 The court explained that all three reasons exceeded the “extremely low” threshold for upholding distinctions under rational basis
review.103 Thus, the Third Circuit denied the plaintiff’s petition for review of the immigration court’s decision.104
IMMIGRATION LAW—FOURTH AMENDMENT—The Third Circuit in YocUs v. Attorney General of United States105 considered for the first time
whether the exclusionary rule, or any applicable exceptions, applied to
Fourth Amendment violations when the offending officer is a state officer,
rather than a federal agent.106 The petitioner argued the exclusionary
rule should apply to suppress evidence of the petitioners’ alienage status,
which was used in the original civil removal proceedings.107 Judge
Rendell, writing for the court, concluded that the deterrent effect of applying the full exclusionary rule to immigration proceedings was low because “state and local officers are already ‘punished’ by the use of the
exclusionary rule in criminal proceedings.”108 In a separate federal immigration proceeding, the court reasoned exclusion would have little deterrent potential and that the deterrence value was further reduced because
of the “intersovereign nature of this case.”109 The court determined that
the Supreme Court’s exceptions to the exclusionary rule’s application apply to cases that involve state officers.110 The court concluded the petitioners had the right to present evidence of a Fourth Amendment
violation, and therefore remanded the case to an immigration judge.111
IMMIGRATION LAW—FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT—In E.D. v. Sharkey,112
the Third Circuit held that immigration detainees are entitled to the same
due process protections as pretrial detainees.113 An immigration officer
forced a female detainee to engage in sexual intercourse on several occa100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 405.
Id. at 404.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 405.
932 F.3d 98 (3d Cir. 2019) (Rendell, J.).
Id. at 101.
Id. at 106.
Id. (citing United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 448 (1976)).
Id. at 110.
Id. at 112.
Id. at 113.
928 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2019) (Restrepo, J.)
Id. at 303.
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sions, which resulted in the detainee filing a claim against the facility.114
She believed the immigration facility deliberately ignored her claims and
failed to adopt policies that harshly address the officer’s behavior.115 The
district court believed “a factfinder could reasonably find” the county that
operated the immigration facility liable for the officer’s conduct.116 The
Third Circuit joined several other circuit courts in concluding that the
detainee’s right to protection in the immigration facility was clearly established at the time of misconduct.117 The court remanded the matter back
to the district court because it lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of
summary judgment against the county government.118 Chief Judge Smith
concurred, criticizing the district court’s use of “footnote order[s]” and
noting this practice likely does not provide enough specificity in qualified
immunity decisions.119 Instead, Chief Judge Smith called for a more
meaningful review of the district court’s qualified immunity decision and
requested opinions from lower courts rather than simple orders.120
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW—COPYRIGHTS—In T.D. Bank N.A. v.
Hill,121 the Third Circuit addressed whether a portion of the defendant’s
book that included a manuscript co-authored with the plaintiff while acting as CEO of Commerce Bank, who had since merged with plaintiff T.D.
Bank (the Bank), infringed on a copyright owned by the Bank.122 The
district court concluded that the Bank owned the copyright under a letter
agreement with the defendant, and their use of the manuscript constituted an irreparable violation of the Bank’s “right to not use the copyright.”123 While the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, it
did so for different reasons.124 Within the analysis, Judge Krause, writing
on the behalf of the court, believed the district court improperly applied
vesting of ownership principles instead of deciding whether the work fell
within the defendant’s scope of employment.125 If the manuscript fell
within the scope of employment, it would receive “for-hire” treatment,
meet the first definition “work for hire” under the 1976 Copyright Act,
and the defendant would lack any rights to the copyright.126 First, the
court concluded that the Bank served as the assignee for the copyright.127
The court then used Supreme Court precedent and other Courts of Ap114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 304.
Id.
Id. at 305.
Id. at 307–08.
Id. at 310.
Id. at 310–11 (Smith, C.J., concurring).
Id. (Smith, C.J., concurring).
928 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2019) (Krause, J.).
Id. at 265.
Id.
Id. at 271.
Id. at 271–72, 276–77.
Id. at 276.
Id. at 275.
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peals’ decisions in concluding the appropriate test for scope of employment is the one advanced by the Second Restatement of Agency.128 In
pertinent part, the test states that a work falls within the scope of employment only if “[1] it is of the kind he is employed to perform; [2] it occurs
substantially within the authorized time and space limits; and [3] it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the [employer].”129 Because
the lower court did not examine this issue, the Third Circuit remanded to
resolve the underlying factual disputes.130 Judge Cowen, concurring in
part and dissenting in part, disagreed with the court’s ownership analysis,
stating (1) the Bank previously waived the issue of assignment, and (2)
even assuming assignment is at issue, the letter did not “meet[ ] the legal
requirements for an assignment of a copyright interest.”131
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW—COPYRIGHTS—In Silvertop Associates Inc.
v. Kangaroo Manufacturing,132 the Third Circuit evaluated the validity of a
banana costume copyright by determining whether the “pictorial, graphic,
or sculptural features” of the costume could be separated from its utilitarian function, and whether allowing the copyright would monopolize the
idea of a banana costume.133 Judge Hardiman, along with Judge Chagares
and Judge Goldberg, held that the costume’s design features—its color,
shape, length, and lines—could be separated in whole from the costume’s
functional aspect and were copyrightable.134 Moreover, neither merger
nor scenes a faire doctrines prevented the costume from being copyrighted.135 The decision utilized the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc.136 to determine the
usefulness of the costume.137
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW—FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (FLSA)—
In Secretary of United States Department of Labor v. Bristol Excavating, Inc.,138
the Third Circuit discussed whether an employer must add bonuses provided by third parties to an employee’s regular rate of pay when calculating overtime compensation.139 Prior to review, the district court agreed
with the Department of Labor and held that Bristol Excavating, the employer, had violated the FLSA because third-party bonuses are “renumeration for employment” and must always be included in the calculation of
128. Id. at 276–77.
129. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Avtec Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, 21 F.3d 568, 571 (4th Cir. 1994)).
130. Id. at 286.
131. Id. at 288 (Cowen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
132. 931 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2019) (Hardiman, J.).
133. Id. at 219, 222.
134. Id. at 222.
135. Id. at 223.
136. 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017).
137. Kangaroo Mfg., 931 F.3d at 220–21.
138. 935 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 2019) (Jordan, J.)
139. Id. at 127–28.
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regular rate of pay.140 Judge Jordan, writing for Chief Judge Smith and
Judge Rendell, disagreed with the district court and held that third-party
bonuses are not per se “renumeration for employment” under the FLSA’s
definition, and a third-party bonus “qualifies as remuneration for employment only when the employer and employee have effectively agreed it
will.”141 Judge Jordan, looking to statutory history, common law, and
“common sense,” believed that “[i]mposing unexpected costs on employers does not work to the long-term benefit of employees,” as employers
would be required to pay overtime wages not based upon their own agreements with their employees.142 Therefore, the inclusion of third-party bonuses in the calculation of regular rate of pay and overtime pay must be
explicitly agreed upon by the individual employer and employee.143
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW—FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
AUTHORIZATION ACT (FAAAA)—In Bedoya v. American Eagle Express,144 the
Third Circuit considered whether the FAAAA preempts the New Jersey
Wage and Hour Law’s (NJWHL) and the New Jersey Wage Payment Law’s
(NJWPL) definition of “employee” for the purposes of employment
claims.145 Judge Shwartz, writing on behalf of the court, ruled that the
FAAAA did not preempt the state law employee definitional test. According to the court, the state law’s classification of independent contractors
versus employees had no direct or significant impact on the defendant
carrier’s “prices, routes, or services.”146 In reaching this conclusion, the
court noted that the FAAAA will preempt a state law if the state law has an
indirect or direct “significant” impact on carrier prices, routes, or services.147 However, the court noted a lack of specific guidance from the
Supreme Court regarding an evaluation for significance of impact and offered several factors that courts might look to in the future in an FAAAA
preemption analysis.148
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW—EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT (ERISA)—In Bergamatto v. Board of Trustees of NYSA-ILA Pension
Fund,149 the Third Circuit addressed whether an executive director of a
140. Id. at 129.
141. Id. at 135.
142. Id. at 132–34.
143. Id. at 135.
144. 914 F.3d 812 (3d Cir. 2019) (Shwartz, J.), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 102
(2019).
145. Id. at 816.
146. Id. at 824.
147. Id. at 819–20.
148. Id. at 820–24. These factors include (1) whether the state law applies
strictly to motor carriers, (2) “whether the [state] law addresses the carrier-employee relationship as opposed to the carrier-customer relationship,” (3) “whether
the law binds the carrier to provide a particular price, route, or service,” or (4)
Congress’ attempts to create blanket legislation and avoid “patchwork” state law.
Id. at 820–23 (third internal quotation marks omitted).
149. 933 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2019) (Jordan, J.).
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pension fund falling outside ERISA’s definition of “administrator” may be
liable as a “de facto administrator.”150 ERISA “allows suit against an administrator for not responding to requests for certain information.”151 The
parties did not dispute that the executive director fell outside the statutory
definition, so the court considered whether to expand the definition of
administrator beyond the statute’s language.152 Although the Eleventh
and First Circuits previously adopted a limited de facto administrator theory, “[m]ost courts” that had addressed the question, including the present lower court, declined to expand the definition.153 Judge Jordan,
writing for the court, held that the administrator title applies only to those
who fit the statutory definition and declined to “stretch the term to authorize penalties against others whom a disappointed plan participant
might like to reach.”154 Relying on precedent from the Supreme Court
and prior Third Circuit decisions, Judge Jordan cautioned against “courts
. . . reading remedies into ERISA’s carefully-crafted enforcement scheme”
and stated the statute “should be leniently and narrowly construed.”155
Therefore, the court declined to adopt the de facto administrator
theory, succinctly stating that “there is no such thing as a ‘de facto
administrator.’ ”156
PROPERTY LAW—NATURAL GAS ACT—In Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v.
Permanent Easement for 7.053 Acres,157 the Third Circuit considered for the
first time “whether state law or federal law governs the measure of just
compensation in condemnation proceedings brought by a private entity
under the [Natural Gas Act].”158 The Natural Gas Act (NGA) allows gas
companies to exercise eminent domain over private property in order to
use the land for gas pipelines.159 The district court held that federal
courts should use federal law to determine the amount of compensation
owed when this happens.160 Nevertheless, the language of the NGA does
not indicate whether federal or state law should govern.161 Judge Greenaway Jr., writing for the court, relied on analysis from the Fifth and Sixth
Circuits that declined to create a “uniform rule of compensation” and allowed compensation amounts to be determined under state law.162 The
150. Id. at 266.
151. Id. (alteration in original); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1) (2018) (outlining consequences for administrators’ failure to comply with information requests).
152. Bergamatto, 933 F.3d at 266.
153. Id. at 266–67 (discussing other circuits’ interpretations); id. at 262 (reviewing lower court’s analysis and reluctance extending administrator definition).
154. Id. at 269.
155. Id. at 268.
156. Id. at 268–69.
157. 931 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2019) (Greenaway Jr., J.).
158. Id. at 246.
159. Id. at 241.
160. Id. at 242.
161. Id. at 246.
162. Id. at 246–47.
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court, in reversing the district court, decided to incorporate state law because “(i) fashioning a nationally uniform rule is unnecessary, (ii) incorporating state law does not frustrate the NGA’s objectives, and (iii)
application of a uniform federal rule would upset commercial relationships.”163 Judge Chagares believed that the standard for compensation “is
the same regardless of whether it is the Government or a Governmentdelegatee that exercises that power” and therefore, that pre-existing precedent solves this legal issue.164
PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS—AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
(ADA)—In Matheis v. CSL Plasma, Inc.,165 the Third Circuit decided
whether a plasma donation center falls within the ADA’s public accommodation requirements as a service establishment and thus could be subject
to a unreasonable discrimination claim for failure to accommodate.166
The district court concluded, much like the Fifth Circuit, that plasma donation centers are not “service establishments,” and the ADA does not affect CSL Plasma’s blanket ban on donors requiring psychiatric service
animals.167 Judge Ambro, writing for the court, agreed with the district
court’s decision that plasma donation centers are “service establishments”
under the ADA.168 This aligned with the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Levorsen v. Octapharma Plasma, Inc.,169 stating that plasma donation centers are
“place[s] of business” regardless of whether individuals engage in business
for “altruistic purposes or pecuniary gain.”170 Furthermore, Judge Ambro
held that on remand, “the [c]ourt may determine whether to permit CSL
to move for summary judgment on other grounds, to hold trial, or to conclude on the facts presented that CSL violated the ADA.”171
SECURITIES—SECURITIES ACT OF 1933—In Obasi Investment LTD v. Tibet
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,172 the Third Circuit held that “a nonvoting board observer affiliated with an issuer’s placement agent” did not perform similar
functions as board directors.173 Two board observers helped prepare Tibet Pharmaceuticals’ initial public offering, but at the same time, remained separate from matter submitted for the Board of Directors’
approval.174 Once the Chinese government froze all of the company’s assets, plaintiffs sued the two board observers, among others, for failing to
163. Id. at 251.
164. Id. at 255 (Chagares, J., dissenting).
165. 936 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 2019) (Ambro, J.).
166. Id. at 174.
167. Id. at 176–78.
168. Id. at 182.
169. 828 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 2016).
170. Matheis, 936 F.3d at 177 (first internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Levorsen, 828 F.3d at 1231).
171. Id. at 182.
172. 931 F.3d 179 (3d Cir. 2019) (Hardiman, J.).
173. Id. at 181.
174. Id. at 181–82.
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disclose the company’s questionable financial information.175 The Third
Circuit reversed the district court’s determination that the board director
and board observer were similar, and it granted summary judgment for
the defendants.176 Judge Hardiman, writing the court, determined that
two defendants were not similar to directors because of their inability to
vote on matters, their lack of loyalty being as compared to a typical director, and their immunity from being voted out of their position.177 In dissent, Judge Cowen argued the defendant observers are “similar” to the
directors and advocated for a broader definition of directors.178 Judge
Cowen highlighted the purpose of the 1933 Securities Act’s purpose of
provide protection to investors, thus, urging the court to treat the defendants as similar.179
SECURITIES—STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR INJUNCTIONS—In SEC v.
Gentile,180 the Third Circuit addressed whether the default federal statute
of limitations applied to two injunctions sought by the SEC.181 Judge
Hardiman, joined by Judge Krause and Judge Greenberg, held that the
injunctions were not penalties, and therefore, were not subject to the statute of limitations imposed on penalties.182 The law in question, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78(u)(d), gives the SEC authority to implement injunctions, and the
court compared the law’s function to traditional principles of equity.183
These equity principles allowed the court to conclude that “Congress
meant [not] to depart from the rule that injunctions are issues to prevent
harm rather than punish past wrongdoing.”184 If the SEC fails to highlight a “meaningful showing of actual risk of harm,” the statute of limitations do not apply, and courts should dismiss “as a matter of equitable
discretion.”185 The court supported the position held by the Eleventh Circuit, stating that “injunctions cannot be penalties under § 2462 because
they are equitable.”186 The court remanded and instructed the district
court to decide “whether the injunctions sought are permitted
under § 78u(d).”187

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. at 182.
Id. at 181.
Id. at 189.
Id. at 192–93.
Id.
939 F.3d 549 (3d Cir. 2019) (Hardiman, J.).
Id. at 553.
Id. at 552.
See id. at 556.
Id. at 557.
Id. at 562.
Id. at 561 (citing SEC v. Graham, 823 F.3d 1357, 1360 (11th Cir. 2016)).
Id. at 552.
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En Banc
TORT LAW—FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT (FTCA)—In Pellegrino v.
United States of America Transportation Secretary Administration, Division of Department of Homeland Security,188 the Third Circuit reversed the decision of
the district court and found that Transportation Security Officers (TSO)
are considered “officer[s] of the United States” for the purposes of intentional torts.189 The court engaged in a frame-by-frame, textual analysis of
28 U.S.C. § 2690(h), which grants officers of the United States the ability
to perform searches.190 Importantly, the court noted the statute already
encompasses “ ‘officers’ within the meaning of the term ‘employee.’ ”191
Judge Ambro rejected any examination of legislative history, stating the
statute’s plain text gives sufficient guidance for the court.192 Judge
Krause, dissenting with Judges Jordan, Hardiman, and Scirica, believed
the statute granted TSOs immunity from suit.193 According to Judge
Krause, because the proviso relied on by the majority applies only to investigatory searches, and TSOs cannot conduct investigatory searches, the
proviso did not apply.194 Further, unlike the majority, Judge Krause relied
on legislative history to confirm that a search conducted by TSOs is not
covered by the proviso.195 In sum, Judge Krause believed the majority’s
holding damaged the supposed coverage the FTCA creates for administrative searches, thus, “[t]ak[ing] the[w]rong [s]ide of a [c]ircuit [s]plit.”196
Appendix of Precedential Civil Opinions
Administrative Law
Liem v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 921 F.3d 388 (3d Cir. 2019) (Rendell, J.)
(vacated and remanded) (holding Board of Immigration Appeals abused
its discretion when failing to meaningfully consider newly presented evidence or provide an explanation for its conclusion in immigration
proceedings).
Americans with Disabilities Act
Furgess v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 933 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2019) (Roth, J.) (vacated and remanded) (declaring state prison providing showers to prisoners constitutes program, service, or activity provided by public entity and
holding state prison’s failure to provide reasonable shower accommoda188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

937 F.3d 164 (3d Cir. 2019) (en banc) (Ambro, J.).
Id. at 168.
Id. at 170–77.
Id. at 171.
Id. at 179–80.
Id. at 181 (Krause, J., dissenting).
Id. at 182–88 (Krause, J., dissenting).
Id. at 194 (Krause, J., dissenting).
Id. at 197 (Krause, J., dissenting).
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tion for disabled prisoners states plausible claim for disability discrimination under both ADA and Rehabilitation Act).
Haberle v. Borough of Nazareth, 936 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 2019) (Scirica, J.)
(reversed and remanded) (finding district court erred in granting motion
to dismiss because plaintiff sufficiently pleaded facts establishing police
department’s history of deliberate indifference to citizens’ mental health
crises under ADA, by alleging department drafted, but did not adopt, policies to correct existing inadequacies).
Antitrust
Spartan Concrete Prods., LLC v. Argos USVI, Corp., 929 F.3d 107 (3d Cir.
2019) (Hardiman, J.) (affirmed) (holding (1) that plaintiff did not show
antitrust violation under Robinson–Patman Act due to insufficient evidence of a causal connection between price discrimination and damages
suffered, and (2) that district court’s denial of motions to amend were not
an abuse of discretion because the lower court highlighted past instances
of undue delay).
Arbitration
Jaludi v. Citigroup, 933 F.3d 246 (3d Cir. 2019) (Smith, C.J.) (affirmed
in part, reversed in part, and remanded) (reversing district court’s order
compelling arbitration of Sarbanes–Oxley claim after finding parties’ second arbitration agreement superseded its first arbitration agreement, and
the second agreement excluded claims under Sarbanes–Oxley; but affirming district court’s finding that Dodd–Frank Act does not limit authority to arbitrate Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) claims).
Singh v. Uber Techs. Inc., 939 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2019) (Greenaway Jr.,
J.) (vacated and remanded) (vacating district court’s dismissal on grounds
that Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) excludes “workers engaged in foreign
or interstate commerce,” which the circuit court held applies to transportation workers who transported passengers); id. at 228–232 (Porter, J., concurring in part) (siding with the majority, but describing disagreement
with decision on two fronts: (1) immediately starting discovery on remand
may lead to inefficiencies the FAA seeks to avoid; and (2) the lower court
on remand may unnecessarily broaden the scope of discovery at the prearbitration phase due to the majority’s decision).
Bankruptcy
Shearer v. Titus (In re Titus), 916 F.3d 293 (Ambro, J.) (affirmed)
(holding (1) the fraudulent-transfer liability attached to both an insolvent
attorney and defendant’s wife when wages were deposited into a bank account they owned as tenants by the entireties; (2) the trustee waived use of
Non-Necessities Approach for purposes of calculating liability for the
transfer; (3) the bankruptcy court did not err in declining to exclude non-
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wage deposits from liability calculations; and (4) a clarified approach for
future fraudulent transfer bankruptcy liability calculations should be
utilized).
S.S. Body Armor I, Inc. v. Carter Ledyard & Milburn LLP, 927 F.3d 763
(3d Cir. 2019) (Greenaway Jr., J.) (affirmed) (finding district court properly denied creditor’s emergency stay motion, which sought to stay distributions from a second settlement agreement pending resolution of the
creditor’s fee reserve appeal, because creditor had a “fatally low likelihood
of succeeding in its Fee Reserve Appeal”).
Civil Procedure
Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., 932 F.3d 126 (3d
Cir. 2019) (Ambro, J.) (affirmed and remanded), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct.
2762 (2020) (clarifying Supreme Court precedent in First Nat’l City Bank v.
Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba (Bancec), 462 U.S. 611 (1983) concerning extensive-control inquiry, and approving attachment of Venezuelan, state-owned company’s United States-based assets to satisfy judgment
against Venezuela).
GN Netcom, Inc. v. Plantronics, Inc., 930 F.3d 76 (3d Cir. 2019) (Fisher,
J.) (affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded) (holding, by using
three-factor analysis for Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 37 sanctions, that district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing sanction
of a permissive adverse inference instruction to jury about the nature of
defendant’s deleted emails; but concluding district court’s denial of expert testimony, that defendant may have engaged in far greater spoliation
of evidence than was known, was not harmless error and necessitated a
new trial); id. at 89–93 (Smith, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (joining the majority opinion to find district court did not abuse its
discretion, and writing separately to contend majority’s finding as to the
expert testimony).
Golden v. New Jersey Inst. of Tech. v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 934 F.3d
302 (3d Cir. 2019) (Smith, C.J.) (reversed and remanded) (reversing district court’s denial of attorney’s fees for plaintiff under New Jersey’s Open
Public Records Act, and holding nexus between requester’s litigation and
release of records required by statute for attorney’s fees existed when the
defendant withheld records according to FBI orders).
Guerra v. Consol. Rail Corp., 936 F.3d 124 (3d Cir. 2019) (Porter, J.)
(affirmed) (finding Federal Railroad Safety Act’s 180-day limitations period for filing a claim is non-jurisdictional, and the district court erred for
dismissing on the basis of subject-matter jurisdiction; however, plaintiff did
not present enough evidence to invoke the mailbox rule regarding their
complaint’s mailing to Occupational Safety Health Administration, therefore the claim was untimely and barred).
Hildebrand v. Allegheny County, 923 F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 2019) (Fisher, J.)
(vacated and remanded) (finding district court abused its discretion when
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dismissing suit for failure to prosecute by not considering the Poulis factors, misstating the law, relying on findings not supported by the record,
and not considering policy of deciding the case on its merits).
Houser v. Folino, 927 F.3d 693 (3d Cir. 2019) (Chagares, J.) (affirmed)
(finding district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to appoint
new counsel for a state inmate litigant in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim where
the petitioner is capable of representing himself pro se and there is a
shortage of pro bono counsel available).
In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 924 F.3d 662
(3d Cir. 2019) (Smith, C.J.) (vacated and remanded) (holding district
court failed to apply presumption of public access and incorrectly placed
burden on parties seeking sealed documents to show interest in disclosure
of protective order); id. at 680–84 (Restrepo, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (writing separately to argue majority should have addressed First Amendment issues raised by the plans).
League of Women Voters of Pa. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 921 F.3d
378 (3d Cir. 2019) (Scirica, J.) (affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded) (affirming award of costs and fees under 28 U.S.C. §1447(c) in
gerrymandering case, but reversing on basis that state representatives are
exempt from personal liability under Section 1447(c) when acting in their
official capacity).
Malhan v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of State, 938 F.3d 453 (3d Cir. 2019)
(Hardiman, J.) (affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded) (determining that for certain claims, district court did not have subject-matter
jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman doctrine because interlocutory orders
are not final judgments, and Younger abstention was not warranted because district court had federal question jurisdiction).
Robinson v. First State Cmty. Action Agency, 920 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2019)
(Fuentes, J.) (affirmed), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 464 (2019) (holding (1)
when a party assents to jury instructions, they have waived their right to
argue the adequacy of the instructions on appeal; (2) the inclusion of a
statutory damage cap in jury instructions was harmless error; and (3) denial of a new trial, on the basis of the disclosure of a damages cap, was not
an abuse of discretion because it was immediately struck from the record).
T Mobile Ne. LLC v. City of Wilmington, 913 F.3d 311 (3d Cir. 2019)
(Jordan, J.) (reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded) (holding
oral decision was not a final action ripe for judicial review because written
documents are required; that thirty-day time limit in Telecommunication
Act’s review provision was not jurisdictional; and that under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 15(d), an untimely supplemental complaint can, by relating back, cure an initial complaint that was unripe).
Weber v. McGrogan, 939 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2019) (Matey, J.) (dismissed)
(dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction because prior district court order that dismissed complaint without prejudice was not a final appealable
order and the prior order was not a “docket entry” that would begin the
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150-day period for appeal under the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule
58(c)(2)(B)).
Class Action
In re Asbestos Prod. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 921 F.3d 98 (3d Cir. 2019)
(Smith, C.J.) (reversed) (granting motion to dismiss on res judicata
grounds and also concluding that a party can implicitly waive and forfeit
their personal jurisdiction defense by performing actions that are consistent with expressed waiver, thus, creating a circuit split with the Sixth Circuit); id. at 110–16 (Fisher, J. dissenting) (disagreeing and arguing the
multidistrict litigation court should be afforded significant deference and
did not make a clearly erroneous finding as to the defendants’ preservation of personal jurisdiction).
In re NFL Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 923 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 2019)
(Smith, C.J.) (affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded) (determining district court could not void all cash advance
agreements in their entirety that touched only on lender’s right to receive
disbursed funds acquired by players, but affirming that any true assignments are void).
In re: Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig., 934 F.3d 316
(3d Cir. 2019) (Ambro, J.) (vacated and remanded) (finding internet service provider created concrete injury by tracking a person’s internet activity without authorization, that a cy pres settlement was not inherently
unfair to the members of the class, and the district court did not persuasively assess the fairness, reasonability, and adequacy of the settlement,
specifically, “the broad class-wide release of claims for money damages,
and selection of the specific cy pres recipients”).
Commercial Law
Fed Cetera, LLC v. Nat’l Credit Servs., Inc., 938 F.3d 466 (3d Cir. 2019)
(Fuentes, J.) (reversed, vacated, and remanded) (deciding term “consummate” in context of debt collection contract did not require complete performance of contract based on context of contractual language and
behavior of parties, and that plaintiff may be eligible for finder’s fee associated with contract).
In re Remicade (Direct Purchaser) Antitrust Litig., 938 F.3d 515 (3d Cir.
2019) (Krause, J.) (reverse and remand) (finding distributor’s antitrust
claims relating to paying artificially inflated prices “arise out of or relate
to” distribution agreement because inflated prices were in agreements,
thus, they must be arbitrated in accordance with agreement’s arbitration
provision).
Jester v. Hutt, 937 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2019) (Hardiman, J.) (affirmed in
part, vacated in part, and remanded) (concluding settlement agreement
between breeding facility and horse owner case was not nullified on a
fraudulent basis and affirming denial of owner’s motion for new trial, but
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vacating and remanding on the basis that district court erred by reducing
the punitive damages awarded).
Oberdorf v. Amazon.com Inc., 930 F.3d 136 (3d Cir. 2019) (Roth, J.)
(affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded), reh’g en banc granted,
opinion vacated by 936 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding (1) Amazon is a
“seller” under the Second Restatement of Torts based on its role in the
supply chain and its role in the distribution of the item and thus subject to
Pennsylvania strict products liability law; and (2) plaintiff’s claims against
Amazon are not barred by the safe harbor provision of Communications
Decency Act (CDA), except for ones that rely upon a “failure to warn”
theory of liability); id. at 154–65 (Scirica, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (dissenting from majority’s holding that plaintiff’s claims
were not barred by the CDA).
Sköld v. Galderma Labs. L.P., 917 F.3d 186 (3d Cir. 2019) (Jordan, J.)
(affirmed in part and reversed in part) (overturning petitioner’s unjust
enrichment award because previous agreement between the parties unambiguously transferred ownership of trademark rights to a proprietary drugdelivery formulation to defendant, and petitioner was not in fact the
owner of the rights).
Wolfington v. Reconstructive Orthopaedic Assocs. II PC, 935 F.3d 187 (3d
Cir. 2019) (Fuentes, J.) (affirmed in part and reversed in part) (finding
debtor failed to allege a Truth in Lending Act (TILA) violation because
the unenforced payment plan was not documented in formal writing as
required by TILA, and reversing imposition of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 sanctions against debtor’s counsel).
Constitutional Law
Bank of Hope v. Miye Chon, 938 F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 2019) (Bibas, J.)
(vacated and remanded) (finding ban on corporate officer from contacting shareholders, in dispute over whether officer embezzled funds, constituted a collateral order sufficient to grant jurisdiction, and that district
court violated corporate officer’s First Amendment by being overly restrictive under the Supreme Court’s Central Hudson test for commercial
speech).
Beers v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 927 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2019) (Roth, J.)
(affirmed), cert. granted, judgment vacated by Beers v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 2758
(2020) (finding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4), statute limiting mentally ill individuals from processing fire arms, did not burden plaintiff’s Second Amendment protections because plaintiff was member of “historically-barred”
class of persons as they had previously been adjudicated as mentally ill and
committed to mental institution, thus, outside scope of the Second
Amendment).
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019) (Ambro, J.)
(affirmed), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 1104 (2020) (holding city’s policy to
refuse referrals of foster children to agencies that, because of their relig-
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ious views, refused to facilitate placements with same-sex couples was constitutional under First Amendment because policy does not mask ill will
toward a specific religious group, force particular viewpoint, or retaliate
against protected activity).
Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. County of Lehigh, 933 F.3d 275 (3d
Cir. 2019) (Hardiman, J.) (reversed) (finding official county seal that depicts religious symbol, along with several secular symbols of historical, patriotic, cultural, and economic significance to the community did not
violate First Amendment Establishment Clause and that the Lemon-endorsement framework did not apply because of Supreme Court’s recent
decision in American Legion v. American Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067
(2019)).
Knick v. Township of Scott, 932 F.3d 152 (3d Cir. 2019) (Smith, C.J.)
(affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded) (applying Supreme
Court’s intervening interpretation of Fifth Amendment Takings Clause in
the context of a local government taking property to establish that plaintiff does not need to exhaust state law remedies prior to bringing an action
in federal court).
Ne. Pa. Freethought Soc’y v. Cty. of Lackawanna Transit Sys., 938 F.3d 424
(3d Cir. 2019) (Hardiman, J.) (reversed and remanded) (holding rejection of an advertisement based on religious and atheistic messages by
transit system discriminated based on viewpoint, violating the First Amendment, and there was no reasonable content-based restriction of neutral
viewpoint speech); id. at 442–53 (Cowen, J. dissenting) (arguing transit
system’s advertisement policy excludes religion itself and should be analyzed under subject-matter prohibition where the reasonableness standard
is met, not viewpoint discrimination).
Corporate Law
Mauthe v. Optum Inc., 925 F.3d 129 (3d Cir. 2019) (Greenberg, J.)
(affirmed), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 563 (2019) (finding companies maintaining healthcare provider database, who faxed information update requests
to appellant, did not violate Telephone Consumer Protection Act because
the communications were not solicitations).
Education Law
G.S. v. Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist., 914 F.3d 206 (3d Cir. 2018) (per
curiam) (affirmed) (holding student living in their maternal grandparents’ home with their parents qualified for youth homelessness as covered
by the Mckinney–Veto Homeless Assistance Act, which obligated school
district to enroll the student under the Act).
Energy Law
In re PennEast Pipeline Co., 938 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 2019) (Jordan, J.) (vacated and remanded) (holding Natural Gas Act does not constitute dele-
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gation to private parties of federal government’s exemption from Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity, and finding that New Jersey retained its
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity).
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA)
Barbato v. Greystone All., LLC, 916 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2019) (Krause, J.)
(affirmed), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 245 (2019) (holding appellant satisfied
“principal purpose” test to qualify as a “debt collector” under FDCPA, regardless of fact that it employed a third party to perform actual collection
practices).
DiNaples v. MRS BPO, LLC, 934 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2019) (Chagares, J.)
(affirmed) (holding “concrete injury” required for federal standing satisfied when debt collector sent letter displaying QR code that revealed account number with the debt collection agency when scanned and that QR
code’s visibility renders information “ ‘susceptible to privacy intrusions,’
even if it does not facially display any ‘core information relating to the
debt collection’ ” in violation of FDCPA, and finding defendant was not
entitled to the bona fide error defense for misinterpretation of the law).
Fair Housing Act
Curto v. A Country Place Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 921 F.3d 405 (3d Cir. 2019)
(Ambro, J.) (reversed and remanded) (finding sex-segregated pool schedule, which allocated males favorable swim times, to be discriminatory on
its face under the Fair Housing Act, despite roughly equal aggregate swim
time for each sex); id. at 411–13 (Fuentes, J., concurring) (writing separately to voice skepticism that a sex-segregated schedule would be upheld
if it more equitably divided the favorable weeknight hours between the
sexes).
False Claims Act—Qui Tam Action
Chang v. Children’s Advocacy Ctr. of Del., 938 F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 2019)
(Porter, J.) (affirmed) (affirming dismissal of appellant’s qui tam action,
holding relator is not entitled to an automatic in-person hearing prior to
dismissal when relator fails to request a hearing).
United States ex rel. Doe v. Heart Sol., PC, 923 F.3d 308 (3d Cir. 2019)
(Roth, J.) (affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded) (holding
lower court failed to correctly separate all criminal and civil elements of
civil Medicare fraud case when there was prior criminal proceeding).
United States ex rel. Charte v. Am. Tutor, Inc., 934 F.3d 346 (3d Cir. 2019)
(Fuentes, J.) (vacated and remanded) (acknowledging concurrent jurisdiction providing for qui tam claim’s non-exclusive availability in state
court forum but holding New Jersey’s entire controversy doctrine as inapplicable to preclude qui tam action in federal court when filed during pendency of state tort law action between same parties); id. at 354–56
(Hardiman, J. dissenting) (stating majority is allowing plaintiff “a second
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bite at the apple” and arguing preclusion of plaintiff’s claims would not be
unfair and that revival of the claims, after seven years, is unfair to
defendants).
Immigration Law
Basardo-Vale v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 934 F.3d 255 (3d Cir. 2019)
(Shwartz, J.) (petition denied) (overruling Alaka v. Attorney Gen. of U.S.,
456 F.3d 88 (2006), and holding that a “particularly serious crime” in the
asylum and withholding of removal statutes, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2),
1231(b)(3), includes, but is not limited to aggravated felonies, as aggravated felonies are a subset of particularly serious crimes, such that petitioners conviction for second-degree unlawful imprisonment constituted a
particularly serious crime); id. at 268–74 (McKee, J., dissenting) (joining
Judge Ambro’s dissent and disagreeing with majority’s interpretation of
the statutory phrase “by regulation”); id. at 274–75 (Ambro, J., dissenting)
(writing separately from Judge McKee to discuss error in majority’s interpretation of the withholding of removal statute).
Fang v. Dir. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 935 F.3d 172 (3d Cir.
2019) (McKee, J.) (reversed and remanded) (reversing district court’s dismissal and holding order by Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) terminating visas of non-immigrant students who enrolled in fake
university created by Department of Homeland Security, as a method for
ICE to catch brokers in fraudulent student visa transactions, was final and
subject to judicial review under Administrative Procedure Act).
Hillocks v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 934 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 2019) (Fuentes,
J.) (vacated and remanded) (vacating district court’s order to remove
alien, and holding conviction for Pennsylvania state crime of using a communication facility—a phone—to facilitate felony of selling heroin did not
constitute aggravated felony or conviction relating to controlled substance
under federal immigration laws, thus, could not serve as a basis for alien’s
removal).
Ku v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 912 F.3d 133 (3d Cir. 2019) (Vanaskie, J.)
(petition for review denied in part and dismissed in part) (finding (1) that
clear and convincing evidence of loss to victims of over $10,000 was sufficiently tethered to wire fraud conviction such that conviction qualified as
aggravated felony; (2) that Board of Immigration Appeals did not err in
determining wire fraud constitutes crime of moral turpitude; and (3) circuit court did not have jurisdiction to review Board of Immigration Appeals’ discretionary denial of waiver of admissibility under Immigration
and Nationality Act).
Louis v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 914 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 2019) (Bibas, J.)
(affirmed) (affirming Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision not to reopen a removal order because (1) a non-lawyer’s bad legal advice, advising
petitioner that they could miss their asylum hearing, was not an excep-
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tional circumstance, and (2) in absentia removal orders do not categorically violate due process).
Luziga v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 937 F.3d 244 (3d Cir. 2019) (Fisher, J.)
(vacated and remanded) (finding Immigration Judge and Board of Immigration Appeals failed to apply the current legal standard for particularly
serious crime determinations under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B); vacating
the Immigration Judge’s order of removal where a noncitizen committed
an offense that was not particularly serious crime per se; finding the Immigration Judge erred by holding the noncitizen’s failure to produce corroborating evidence against him, without first giving him notice and
opportunity to provide evidence or explain its absence).
Madar v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 918 F.3d 120 (3d Cir. 2019)
(Porter, J.) (affirmed) (declining to extend constructive presence doctrine to transmission of citizenship under Immigration and Nationality Act
when no government error prevented plaintiff’s foreign-born father from
retaining citizenship).
Sambare v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 925 F.3d 124 (3d Cir. 2019) (Restrepo,
J.) (petition denied) (denying lawful permanent resident’s requested review of Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision because appellant conviction of driving while under influence of marijuana can be a removable
offense and court lacked proper jurisdiction for review).
Tilija v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 930 F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 2019) (Greenaway
Jr., J.) (remanded) (holding Board of Immigration Appeals abused its discretion in failing to accept asylum seeker’s new evidence as true on motion to remand and finding that, with new evidence, plaintiff alleged
prima facie case and reasonable likelihood for relief).
Radiowala v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 930 F.3d 577 (3d Cir. 2019) (Greenaway Jr., J.) (petition dismissed in part and denied in part) (dismissing
plaintiff’s petition for cancellation of removal as an unreviewable decision,
and denying plaintiff’s claim for petition for review as it did not allege
sufficient facts to support requisite hardship, by not indicating they were
part of legally cognizable social group or to find they would be tortured
upon returning to proposed country of removal).
Insurance Law
Pennsylvania v. President U.S., 930 F.3d 543 (3d Cir. 2019) (Shwartz, J.)
(affirmed), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter
and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020) (affirming district
court’s grant of nationwide preliminary injunction banning employers
from opting out of no-cost birth control insurance coverage upon determination that plaintiffs are likely to succeed on merits and “that the balance
of the equities and the public interest both favor issuing an injunction”).
Sapa Extrusions, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 939 F.3d 243 (3d Cir.
2019) (Porter, J.) (affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded) (holding when manufacturer settles lawsuit alleging a defective product, lan-
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guage of specific insurance policy at issue governs terms of recovery, and
remanding for further consideration).
United States ex rel. Bookwalter v. UPMC, 938 F.3d 397 (3d Cir. 2019),
reh’g granted, judgment vacated, 944 F.3d 965 (3d Cir. 2019), and on reh’g, 946
F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2019) (Bibas, J.) (reversed and remanded) (determining
contracts and size of pay were sufficient facts to allege that surgeons are
compensated by referrals, and defendants bear the burden of pleading
Stark Act exceptions under the False Claims Act, similar to litigation affirmative defenses); id. at 418–24 (Ambro, J., concurring) (agreeing
enough was pled to survive motion to dismiss, however, writing separately
to note correlation does not demonstrate surgeon compensation was impacted by referrals and actual causation is required to establish this under
Stark Act).
Labor and Employment Law
ADP, LLC v. Rafferty, 923 F.3d 113 (3d Cir. 2019) (Krause, J.) (vacated
and remanded) (applying New Jersey law and holding overbroad non-solicitation provision between employer and former employees must be blue
penciled by court to reduce undue hardship on employees, given employer’s legitimate business interest in restrictive covenant).
Caesars Entm’t Corp. v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local 68 Pension
Fund, 932 F.3d 91 (3d Cir. 2019) (Hardiman, J.) (affirmed) (holding casino that stopped paying pension fund on one of four buildings in a collective bargaining agreement was not “bargaining out” under
Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act because casino continued
to contribute at remaining buildings and Act’s language only included
“work . . . of the type for which contributions were previously required,” not
contributions that are “still required” (first internal quotation marks omitted) (second alteration in original)).
Komis v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 918 F.3d 289 (3d Cir. 2019)
(Scirica, J.) (affirmed) (declining to address whether same standard applies in federal and state retaliatory hostile work environment claims
under Title VII because plaintiff could not prevail under any applicable
standard).
Stone v. Troy Constr., LLC, 935 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2019) (Jordan, J.)
(vacated and remanded) (vacating district court’s grant of summary judgement for defendant and holding that egregiousness is not required to trigger the statute of limitations in a willful violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act).
Sweda v. Univ. of Pa., 923 F.3d 320 (3d Cir. 2019) (Fisher, J.) (affirmed
in part and reversed in part) (overturning complete motion to dismiss by
finding pension plan participants plausibly alleged two claims for breach
of fiduciary duty for failing to conform to the high standards of 29 U.S.C.
§ 1104(a)(1) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act); id. at
340–48 (Roth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting con-
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cern that this and other class action claims have “targeted” fiduciaries
holding large retirement sums, and dissenting from the majority’s dismissal of the lower court’s amended complaint, specifically, the claim for alleged breach of fiduciary duty).
Tundo v. County of Passaic, 923 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 2019) (Bibas, J.) (affirmed) (holding that removing former government employees, that had
been hired on a trial basis and laid off for poor performance, from rehire
list does not violate constitutional protected property interest under
§ 1983).
Verma v. 3001 Castor, Inc., 937 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2019) (Ambro, J.)
(affirmed) (confirming class of dancers were employees rather than independent contractors of adult gentleman’s club and rejecting club’s argument that FLSA precluded dancers’ claims for unjust enrichment).
Section 1983—Eighth Amendment
Shifflett v. Korsziak, 934 F.3d 356 (3d Cir. 2019) (Ambro, J.) (affirmed
in part, reversed in part, and remanded) (reversing district court’s dismissal and adding to previous holding in Robinson v. Superintendent Rockview
SCI, 831 F.3d 148 (3d Cir. 2016), by holding plaintiff exhaustive administrative remedies when prison failed to respond to grievance in timely
fashion).
Mammana v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 934 F.3d 368 (3d Cir. 2019) (Fuentes, J.) (reversed and remanded) (reversing district court’s dismissal and
holding former inmate’s confinement adequately alleged deprivation and
mutually enforcing conditions under Eight Amendment).
Section 1983—First Amendment
Baloga v. Pittston Area Sch. Dist., 927 F.3d 742 (3d Cir. 2019) (Krause,
J.) (affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded) (holding district
court erred in granting summary judgment on school employee’s § 1983
action alleging violation of their First Amendment rights and retaliation
based on union association, because union membership necessarily involved public concern, and defendants failed to show that their interest in
maintaining efficient workplace and avoiding disruption outweighed employee’s associational interest).
Fields v. Speaker of Pa. House of Representatives, 936 F.3d 142 (3d Cir.
2019) (Ambro, J.) (affirmed in part and reversed in part) (holding
house’s legislative prayer favoring theistic prayer did not violate Establishment Clause and is government speech immune to “attack on free-speech,
free-exercise, or equal-protection grounds”); id. at 163–71 (Restrepo, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (departing from majority on
the constitutionality of selecting chaplains to conduct prayers and arguing
majority’s opinion regarding the guest-chaplain policy cannot be reconciled with Supreme Court’s decision in Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S.
565 (2014)).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2020

27

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 3

874

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65: p. 847

Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93 (3d Cir. 2019) (Greenaway Jr., J.) (reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded) (holding that (1) district
court erroneously granted summary judgment for defendant because all
three theories under plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim for false arrest should
survive when evidence is considered in its entirety, fact issues regarding
city’s failure to train police officers remained, and district court impermissibly granted summary judgment sua sponte without giving adequate notice to plaintiff; (2) evidence that post-dated arrest was relevant to
plaintiff’s claims; and (3) district court gave erroneous jury instructions
that constituted plain error).
Pomicter v. Luzerne Cty. Convention Ctr. Auth., 939 F.3d 534 (3d Cir.
2019) (Scirica, J.) (affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded)
(holding Section 1983 claim brought by animal rights group against a convention center for center’s policy of isolating protest activity to certain areas by entrance is constitutional, however, policies banning profane
language and voice amplification are unconstitutional restrictions on free
speech rights).
Randall v. City of Phila. Law Dep’t, 919 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2019) (Bibas,
J.) (affirmed) (holding continuing-violation doctrine did not extend statute of limitations on malicious prosecution claim because defendants
ceased the alleged violation in August and plaintiff’s continued detention
by non-defendants does not trigger doctrine).
Turco v. City of Englewood, 935 F.3d 155 (3d Cir. 2019) (McKee, J.)
(reversed and remanded) (reversing district court’s grant of summary
judgement for the plaintiff and holding city ordinance that established an
eight-foot buffer zone around health clinics was content neutral).
Section 1983—Fourth Amendment
Estate of Roman v. City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789 (3d Cir. 2019) (Ambro,
J.) (affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded), cert. denied, 140 S.
Ct. 97 (2019) (affirming dismissal by district court of plaintiff’s false imprisonment and malicious prosecution claims, but holding district court’s
dismissal of plaintiff’s municipal liability claims were improper because
plaintiff sufficiently alleged (1) a custom of warrantless searches and (2)
that the city failed to train and supervise its police officers); id. at 806–07
(Jordan, J., concurring) (writing separately to note the consent decree and
amended complaint were sufficient for plaintiff to overcome the motion
to dismiss); id. at 807–12 (Hardiman, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (noting disagreement about which facts were properly before the
court).
Section 1983—Qualified Immunity
Bryan v. United States, 913 F.3d 356 (3d Cir. 2019) (Roth, J.) (affirmed) (holding (1) officers did not violate clearly established constitutional right for purposes of qualified immunity because legal principle is
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not clearly established the day the court announced decision (or even one
or two days later); and (2) search fell within scope of Federal Tort Claims
Act’s discretionary function exception because the officers “did not violate
clearly established constitutional rights”).
Securities
Fan v. StoneMor Partners LP, 927 F.3d 710 (3d Cir. 2019) (Restrepo, J.)
(affirmed) (holding defendant’s sufficient disclosure of information to investors of inherent business risks in a particular transaction can render
plaintiffs’ alleged misrepresentations immaterial in a securities fraud case
and that plaintiffs must establish defendant made false statements with
scienter).
N. Sound Capital LLC v. Merck & Co., 938 F.3d 482 (3d Cir. 2019)
(Krause, J.) (reversed and remanded) (holding Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act’s (SLUSA) mass-action provision does not preclude
individuals who opt-out from asserting individual actions); id. at 495–502
(Shwartz, J., dissenting) (arguing plaintiffs, as class members, benefitted
from pretrial proceedings in the class action cases and “functionally proceeded as a single action with the class actions” and thus fell within the
SLUSA’s preclusion provision).
Social Security Law
Hess v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2019) (Jordan, J.)
(vacated and remanded) (siding with the government and holding an Administrative Law Judge’s determination, or valid explanation, for why a
social security claimant should not receive benefits does not require the
Administrative Law Judge to recite certain language in the explanation).
Sovereign Immunity
Patterson v. Pa. Liquor Control Bd., 915 F.3d 945 (3d Cir. 2019)
(Restrepo, J.) (affirmed) (upholding decision by district court to grant
respondent’s motion to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity grounds and finding Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board an arm of
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania).
Tax Law
SIH Partners LLLP v. Comm’r, 923 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2019) (Greenberg,
J.) (affirmed) (agreeing with United States Tax Court in upholding summary judgement against appellant on validity of taxation regulations for
Controlled Foreign Corporations and proper applied tax rate).
Trade Secrets
Heraeus Med. GmbH v. Esschem, 927 F.3d 727 (3d Cir. 2019) (Krause, J.)
(affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded) (holding owner of trade
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secret was time-barred from bringing suit on misappropriations discovered
more than three years before suit was filed, but finding owner could sue
for misappropriations that occurred within three-year period before filing,
because Pennsylvania applied rule of separate accrual to continuing trade
secret misappropriations, as stated in Pennsylvania Uniform Trade Secrets
Act).
Transportation
Adams Outdoor Advert. Ltd. P’ship v. Pa. Dep’t of Transp., 930 F.3d 199
(3d Cir. 2019) (Ambro, J.) (affirmed in part and reversed in part) (finding
Department of Transportation (DOT) rule excluding billboards 500 feet
from interchanges was not impermissibly vague, DOT failed to meet burden of showing Interchange Prohibition exemptions meet First Amendment scrutiny, and affirming “entry of an injunction prohibiting [DOT]
from enforcing the Pennsylvania Outdoor Advertising Control Act’s permit requirement until PennDOT establishes time limits on its permit
decisions”).
Owner Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n, Inc. v. Pa. Tpk. Comm’n, 934 F.3d
283 (3d Cir. 2019) (Shwartz, J.) (affirmed), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 959
(2020) (affirming district court’s holding that tolls collected and used by
the Pennsylvania Turnpike for non-Turnpike purposes do not violate the
dormant Commerce Clause).
CRIMINAL MATTERS
Issues of First Impression
HABEAS PETITIONS—“IN CUSTODY” REQUIREMENT—In Piasecki v. Court
of Common Pleas, Bucks County,197 the Third Circuit determined whether a
petitioner subject only to sex offender registration requirements was “in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State Court.”198 Judge McKee, writing for the court, determined that the petitioner was “in custody” under
Ross analysis and the registration requirements were part of the judgment
sentence.199 The court recognized that federal courts look to state court
judgment to see if sex offender registration is punitive to determine if the
registration is part of the state court’s judgment.200 Pennsylvania state
courts have ruled that sex registration requirements are punitive punishment and the court records noted the sex offender registration as part of
the sentence.201 Thus, the Third Circuit vacated the district court’s deci197. 917 F.3d 161 (3d Cir. 2019) (McKee, J.), cert. denied, 2019 WL 5686456
(Nov. 24, 2019).
198. Id. at 162 (internal quotation marks omitted).
199. Id. at 167–75.
200. Id. at 173.
201. Id. at 173–75.
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sion that the sex offender registration requirements could not support
habeas corpus jurisdiction.202
HABEAS PETITIONS—GUILTY PLEAS—In Velazquez v. Superintendent Fayette SCI,203 the Third Circuit addressed whether petitioner was entitled to
habeas relief when their counsel failed to object to the defensive guilty but
mentally ill (GBMI) plea procedure in 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 314(b).204 Petitioner tried to enter a GBMI plea given their history of mental illness, but
the trial judge did not accept the plea or examine whether petitioner was
mentally ill at the time of the offense.205 Instead, the trial judge recorded
petitioner had entered a normal guilty plea and trial counsel did not object to the procedure.206 On appeal, the Third Circuit held trial counsel’s
failure to object constituted ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of
the Sixth Amendment, and caused petitioner to suffer prejudice because
there was a reasonable probability they would have taken advantage of the
plea process if it were not for the trial counsel’s failure to object.207 The
Third Circuit noted petitioner did not need to demonstrate that their
GBMI plea would likely be accepted, a favorable finding of severe mental
illness would result, or that the outcome of the two findings would lead to
a lesser sentence.208 Additionally, the court found the district court did
not lack habeas jurisdiction where the petitioner merely asserted that the
wrong guilty plea was entered.209 The Third Circuit vacated the petitioner’s conviction and remanded with instructions to grant the petition
for the writ of habeas corpus with respect to the GBMI claim.210
SIXTH AMENDMENT—INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL—In Workman v. Superintendent Albion SCI,211 the Third Circuit addressed the defendant’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim.212 After trial, a jury
convicted the defendant of first-degree murder on a theory of transferred
intent, a theory their trial counsel did not meaningfully challenge at
trial.213 Defendant’s post-conviction counsel produced a procedurally
faulty writ of habeaus corpus for ineffective assistance of trial counsel,
which was consequently denied.214 On appeal, the defendant sought an
excusal from the Third Circuit on the procedurally faulty ineffective assistance of counsel claim.215 The court excused the defendant’s procedur202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id. at 177.
937 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 2019) (Greenaway Jr., J.).
Id. at 153.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 157.
Id. at 163.
Id. at 153–54.
Id. at 164–65.
915 F.3d 928 (3d Cir. 2019) (Fuentes, J.).
Id.
Id. at 933.
Id.
Id.
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ally faulty petition because their post-conviction counsel was ineffective
and because the underlying claim concerning trial counsel had “some
merit.”216 Additionally, the court found that trial counsel’s assistance was
“manifestly ineffective,” and thus vacated the district court’s order with
remand instructions to grant a conditional writ of habeas corpus.217 Notably, the Third Circuit joined the Seventh and Ninth Circuits in holding
the prejudice element, which is required for an excusal of a procedurally
faulty writ of habeas corpus, is satisfied when post-conviction counsel performs in an unreasonably deficient manner and if the trial counsel’s ineffective assistance is substantial.218
SIXTH AMENDMENT—RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL—In United States v. Bailey-Snyder,219 the Third Circuit addressed whether placing an inmate in
“administrative segregation” constitutes an arrest, thus triggering the protections of the Sixth Amendment and the Speedy Trial Act.220 Judge
Hardiman, joined by Judge Scirica and Judge Rendell, “decline[d] to extend the constitutional speedy trial right ‘to the period prior to arrest.’ ”221
In joining the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits, the court
held that administrative segregation is not an arrest and thus, did not trigger the right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment.222 Likewise,
the Third Circuit joined the Fifth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits in holding
administrative segregation also does not violate the Speedy Trial Act.223
SPEEDY TRIAL ACT—EVENTS “STOPPING” SPEEDY TRIAL CLOCK—In
United States v. Williams,224 the Third Circuit addressed, for the first time,
whether unreasonable delays in transporting a defendant for a psychological examination limited the amount of excludable time provided for psychological examinations under the Speedy Trial Act.225 Judge Restrepo
held that delays longer than ten days in transporting defendants to competency evaluations are non-excludable when determining the time period
within which the government must begin a trial.226 The Third Circuit
joined the First, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits in its determination.227 Consequently, the court remanded the case to the district court to dismiss the
indictment against the defendant with prejudice.228
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 939.
923 F.3d 289 (3d Cir. 2019) (Hardiman, J.).
Id. at 293.
Id. (quoting United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 321 (1971)).
Id. at 294.
Id.
917 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 2019) (Restrepo, J.).
Id. at 201.
Id. at 203.
Id. at 202.
Id. at 205.
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SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE—In United States v. Rowe,229 the Third
Circuit determined the appropriate method to quantify the amount of
drugs relevant to a distribution charge or a possession with intent to distribute charge under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A).230 Judge
Fisher, joined by Chief Judge Smith and Judge McKee, held that separate
acts of distribution of controlled substances are distinct offenses under
Section 841(a), as opposed to a continuing offense.231 Further, the court
held that possession with intent to distribute is a continuing offense that
begins when the defendant has the power and intention to exercise control and dominion over the specified quantity of drugs, and ends when
that possession is interrupted by complete dispossession or a reduction of
an amount less than the specified quantity.232 The court concluded that
the evidence presented by the government, based on the premise that
weights from separate offenses could be combined, was insufficient to allow a rational juror to determine guilt under Section 841 for distribution
and possession with intent to distribute of 1,000 grams of heroin.233 In
addition to remanding the verdict based on the weight of the drugs, the
court vacated the sentencing decision based on the district court’s error of
determining drug weight.234
SUPERVISED RELEASE—FUGITIVE TOLLING—In United States v. Island,235
the Third Circuit decided whether a defendant can count time absent
from the court’s supervision towards service of supervised release period.236 Judge Scirica, writing for the majority, agreed with the majority of
Courts of Appeals in determining that supervised release is tolled when
the party fails to report and comply with supervised release, in other
words, becomes “fugitive.”237 The statute is silent as to the repercussions
of a defendant’s failure to comply with supervised release, so the Third
Circuit agreed with its sister circuits because the resulting decision aligns
with the purpose of supervised release.238 In a dissenting opinion, Judge
Rendell argued that Section 3583(i) requires a warrant to extend the supervised release term, but the majority denied this argument because fugitive tolling is not based in Section 3583(i) jurisdictional grant.239 Thus,
the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s revocation of supervised released in a subsequent sentence.240
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
(2019).
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

919 F.3d 752 (3d Cir. 2019) (Fisher, J.).
Id. at 759.
Id.
Id. at 760.
Id. at 761.
Id. at 763.
916 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2019) (Scirica, J.), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 405
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

250–51.
253.
253–54 (Rendell, J., dissenting).
256–59 (Rendell, J., dissenting).
256.
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Appendix of Precedential Criminal Opinions
Appellate Procedure
United States v. James, 928 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2019) (Jordan, J.) (affirmed) (holding district court properly denied defendant’s motion to
withdraw guilty plea because defendant had not offered any evidentiary
support for entrapment defense, and record did not support assertions
that they were under duress, or that plea was not knowing, voluntary, and
well-informed, or that their counsel was ineffective).
United States v. Mulgrew, 913 F.3d 392 (3d Cir. 2019) (Nygaard, J.) (denying petition for rehearing en banc, granting petition for rehearing by
panel in part) (granting petition solely as to appellant’s claim for entitlement to consideration of sufficiency of evidence of perjury and agreeing
to amend opinion in consolidated case, see United States v. Hird, 913 F.3d
332 (3d Cir. 2019)).
United States v. Nicholas, 914 F.3d 212 (3d Cir. 2019) (Smith, C.J.) (denying petition for rehearing en banc, granting petition for rehearing by
the panel in part), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1325 (2019) (reconsidering solely
evidentiary claim concerning admissibility of 2008 EAA Board Minutes
and agreeing to amend opinion in the consolidated case, see United States
v. Fattah, 914 F.3d 112 (3d Cir. 2019)).
United States v. Tynes, 913 F.3d 393 (3d Cir. 2019) (Nygaard, J.) (denying petition for rehearing en banc, granting petition for rehearing by
panel in part) (granting petition solely as to claim that there was insufficient evidence to support conviction and agreeing to amend opinion in
consolidated case, see United States v. Hird, 913 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 2019)).
Armed Career Criminal Act
United States v. Daniels, 915 F.3d 148 (3d Cir. 2019) (Cowen, J.) (affirmed), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1264 (2020) (holding prior attempt-based
state drug convictions were “serious drug offenses” under Armed Career
Criminal Act).
Criminal Motions—Motions to Sever
United States v. Blunt, 930 F.3d 119 (3d Cir. 2019) (Restrepo, J.) (reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded) (granting motion to sever
for co-defendant spouses being tried jointly to prevent co-defendant from
presenting prejudicial and incriminating testimony against their spouse
and to prevent forcing a spouse to choose between spousal privilege and
fundamental right to testify on one’s own behalf).
Criminal Motions—Motions to Suppress
United States v. Hird, 913 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 2019) (Nygaard, J.) (affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded), cert. denied sub nom. Alfano
v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 657 (2019) and Lowry v. United States, 140 S. Ct.
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656 (2019) (affirming district court’s denial of motion to dismiss because
indictment sufficiently alleged violations of mail fraud and wire fraud; affirming perjury convictions of three appellants; but remanding for resentencing for one defendant because district court erred by using guideline
on obstruction instead of making false statements to FBI).
United States v. Green, 927 F.3d 723 (3d Cir. 2019) (Hardiman, J.) (affirmed) (finding (1) district court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress an inculpatory statement was not in violation of Fifth Amendment
and was lawfully obtained, because defendant’s response was unforeseeable and police officer’s statement lacked coercive influence, and (2) and
denial of a motion to suppress gun and bullets found during a routine patdown search was proper).
United States v. Porter, 933 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 2019) (Hardiman, J.) (affirmed) (holding defendant cannot challenge district court’s denial of a
motion to suppress evidence after entering a guilty plea, because defendant’s Fourth Amendment claims are irrelevant to the judgment of
conviction).
United States v. Trant, 924 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 2019) (Smith, C.J.) (affirmed) (holding district court’s decision was correct in (1) allowing government to reopen case-in-chief as defendant was not affected and had
agreed to motion; (2) restricting defendant from asking witness about unlawful possession of a firearm; and (3) allowing officer testimony to establish that defendant’s firearm was involved in interstate commerce).
Fourth Amendment
United States v. Goldstein, 914 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2019) (Roth, J.) (affirmed) (holding good faith exception applies when government obtained
cell site location information data pursuant to court order under Stored
Communication Act prior to Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206
(2018)).
Habeas Petitions
Cordaro v. United States, 933 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2019) (Chagares, J.)
(affirmed) (acknowledging habeas corpus availability when intervening
statutory interpretation renders alternative remedies inadequate, provided
that actual innocence claim shows “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror properly instructed on the intervening interpretation
would” vote to convict, but affirming denial of habeas corpus petition for
failure to show actual innocence).
Howell v. Superintendent Rockview SCI, 939 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2019)
(Fisher, J.) (affirmed) (affirming on de novo review that the jury selection
procedure did not violate the Sixth Amendment’s fair cross-section requirement by systematically excluding black jurors, even though the Superior Court of Pennsylvania misapplied the Supreme Court’s precedent);
id. at 270–73 (Porter, J., concurring) (noting jury selection process was
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more robust than constitutional requirements, so there cannot be a systematic exclusion); id at 273–83 (Restrepo, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (joining majority’s holding that the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania misapplied the Supreme Court’s precedent, but dissenting
from the remainder of the opinion on the grounds that petitioner established a prima facie violation of the Sixth Amendment right and the commonwealth did not rebut this evidence).
In re Matthews, 934 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2019) (Greenaway Jr., J.) (petitions authorized) (authorizing petitioners’ habeas petitions to challenge
their sentences for convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which prohibited
use or carry of firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence
or drug trafficking crime, following Supreme Court elimination of
§ 924(c)(3)(B) as unconstitutionally vague in United States v. Davis, 139 S.
Ct. 2319 (2019)).
Romansky v. Superintendent Greene SCI, 933 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2019)
(Ambro, J.) (affirmed) (approving dismissal of habeas petition because
defendant’s due process claims were time-barred under one-year limitation period for persons in custody pursuant to state court judgment and
subsequent resentencing judgment did not reset limitation period from
initial trial).
United States v. Santarelli, 929 F.3d 95 (3d Cir. 2019) (Restrepo, J.)
(reversed and remanded) (holding district court erred in denying defendant’s motion to amend their habeas petition because allegations in motion to amend related back to date of initial habeas and motion was not
second or successive habeas petition).
Jury Issues
United States v. Baker, 928 F.3d 291 (3d Cir. 2019) (Jordan, J.) (affirmed) (holding, in a case regarding a police officer’s theft of public
funds, that lower court correctly (1) refused to instruct the jury on entrapment, because officer failed to show inducement on behalf of government,
and (2) excluded officer’s wife’s testimony relating to clinical diagnosis
and medical bills, because less prejudicial evidence was available).
United States v. Greenspan, 923 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 2019) (Bibas, J.) (affirmed) (declining to reverse lower court despite defendant successfully
raising several errors in jury instruction, (1) that the defendant bore the
burden of persuasion in their advice-of-counsel defense, (2) limiting defendant’s testimony regarding their attorney’s advice, (3) limiting scope of
defense to five or eight alleged by defendant, as errors were harmless in
light of overwhelming evidence of guilt).
United States v. Wright, 913 F.3d 364 (3d Cir. 2019) (Shwartz, J.) (reversed and remanded), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 627 (2019) (holding district
court lacked inherent authority to forbid retrial and dismiss indictment);
id. at 376–87 (Nygaard, J. dissenting) (countering that district court does
possess inherent power to dismiss an indictment after serial hung juries);
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id. at 387–92 (McKee, J., concurring) (finding that congressional action is
needed to support).
Sentencing
United States v. A.M., 927 F.3d 718 (3d Cir. 2019) (Bibas, J.) (affirmed)
(holding (1) defendant’s use of device-making equipment, which copies
means of identification, warranted enhancement for bank fraud sentence,
(2) enhanced sentence was not precluded by defendant’s aggravated identity theft conviction, and (3) departure from the statutory minimum was
not necessary because government never moved for a departure).
United States v. Ayala, 917 F.3d 752 (3d Cir. 2019) (Chagares, J.) (affirmed), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 164 (2019) (declining to create bright-line
rule regarding appropriateness of criminal defendants appearing shackled
during non-jury sentencing hearings because district courts need room to
make “individualized security determinations”).
United States v. Chapman, 915 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2019) (Restrepo, J.)
(vacated and remanded) (vacating defendant’s sentence because their
right to allocution was substantially affected by district court’s decision to
proceed with their sentencing hearing, despite fact that neither defendant
nor their family were notified hearing had been scheduled, which precluded defendant from introducing mitigating letters of support).
United States v. Damon, 933 F.3d 269 (3d Cir. 2019) (Matey, J.) (affirmed), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1212 (2020) (affirming grant of government’s motion to enforce plea agreement and affirming dismissal of
defendant’s motion to terminate supervised release under plea agreement
provision waiving right to challenge sentence because “sentence” includes
supervised release and motion to terminate supervised release constitutes
“challenge” to that sentence as matter of contract interpretation).
United States v. Payano, 930 F.3d 186 (3d Cir. 2019) (Krause, J.) (vacated and remanded) (holding district court’s mistaken understanding of
applicable sentencing range substantially affected defendant’s rights and
resentencing is needed to correct error that “seriously affect[ ] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings”).
United States v. Reese, 917 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 2019) (Ambro, J.) (vacated) (holding district court violated Speedy Trial Act when its continuance orders failed to state factual basis for excluding time and did not
invoke Act’s language, therefore not excluding resulting time delay from
Act’s seventy-day limit—even if defendant did not initially object to
continuance).
Sixth Amendment—Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Simon v. Gov’t of Virgin Islands, 929 F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 2019) (Rendell,
J.) (affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded) (finding superior
court abused its discretion in failing to conduct evidentiary hearing to address Brady violation claim by failing to disclose prior agreement with key
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witness; and appellate division erred when it dismissed defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim without first conducting an evidentiary
hearing).
Supervised Release
United States v. Nunez, 928 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2019) (Shwartz, J.) (dismissed in part and affirmed in part), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 526 (2019)
(concluding circuit court did not have jurisdiction over district court’s denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss because it was not a final judgment,
but that it did have jurisdiction to review denial of defendant’s motion for
pre-trial release order, pursuant to Bail Reform Act, and district court correctly declined to mandate release from detention by ICE during pending
removal proceedings).
Sufficiency of the Evidence
United States v. Fattah, 914 F.3d 112 (3d Cir. 2019) (Smith, C.J.), (affirmed in part, vacated, reversed, and remanded in part), cert. denied, 139
S. Ct. 1325 (2019) (vacating five counts for bribery and honest-services
fraud in light of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the term “official
act” in McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016); reversing judgment of acquittal and remanding for sentencing on charges of bank fraud
and making false statements to a financial institution because the evidence
established that Credit Union Mortgage Association was a “mortgage lending business”).
United States v. Garner, 915 F.3d 167 (3d Cir. 2019) (Ambro, J.) (affirmed) (declining to draw inferences in defendant’s favor, that the informant witness was not credible and alternative interpretation of
evidence, while performing sufficiency of evidence review and upholding
jury’s convictions on conspiracy, attempted bank robbery, and firearm
charges).
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